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by
Larry Cornman
National Center for Atmospheric Research*
Research Applications Program
Abstract
Operational demonstrations of a prototype TDWR/LLWAS integrated wind
shear detection system were conducted at Denver's Stapleton International Airport
during the 1989 and 1990 summer seasons. The integration of wind shear detection
systems is needed to provide end-users with a single, consensus source of
information. A properly implemented integrated system provides wind shear
warnings of a higher quality than stand-alone LLWAS or TDWR systems.
The algorithmic concepts used to generate the TDWR/LLWAS integrated
products and several case studies will be discussed, indicating the viability and
potential of integrated wind shear detection systems. Implications for integrating
ground and airborne wind shear detection systems will be briefly examined.
* NCAR is sponsored by the National Science Foundation.
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• Original Phase 1/11LLWAS
Phase I!1 LLWAS
• Runway Extension LLWAS
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COVERING "PARTIAL MISSES"
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'_GRAZING IMPACT"
VIA INTEGRATION,
ONE SYSTEM COULD BE USED
TO "VALIDATE" THE OTHER.
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Integration of the TDWR and LLWAS Wind Shear Detection System
Questions and Answers
Q: WALT OVEREND (Delta Airlines) - Are LLWAS sensors located high enough, that is,
out of ground effect, to be really sensing the relevant air mass or the prevailing air mass as
it effects the runway?
A: LARRY CORNMAN (NCAR) - In a sense there are two parts to that question. One is
the sheltering effects and the other is the accuracy of measurements that are that close to the
ground relative to what a pilot would see along the glide slope. The first part of the
question in terms of the accuracy of measurements form poor locations is something the
FAA has dealt with and is part of some of the upgrades to the six stations, certainly the
enhance LLWAS system. Sheltering effects are taken care of by either raising the sensors
or moving them. The second part of the problem is very difficult. You can only raise the
pole so high. The sensor close to the runway surface is probably a very good estimate of
what the pilot would see. Out further from the runway, one, two, or three miles, it gets
worse. Again, you're limited by the location and the size of the pole that the sensors are
on.
Q: GREG HAEFFELE (Boeing) - If both systems alert on the same microburst, but at
different intensities, which takes precedence? If detected by both systems, does the
"bandaid" size increase to encompass both areas?
A: LARRY CORNMAN (NCAR) - Basically, it's independent. LLWAS and TDWR both
produce bandaids independently. The technique for issuing an alert is based on the
technique that was developed for TDWR, that is, a bandaid intersecting a runway gives a
magnitude and location. If you add more shapes you add extent and potentially larger
magnitude. The idea is to pick the largest magnitude in the f'n'st potential event
encountered.
Q: PAUL ROBINSON (Lockheed) - Complaints from pilots on wind shear reporting have
been largely due to too much information. For example, wind speed and direction at
different points on the airfield. Is this information from the LLWAS? If not, what
information is communicated from ATC to the pilot concerning wind shear on the approach
from LLWAS? If so, can the information be compressed into a more manageable form?
A: LARRY CORNMAN (NCAR) - Basically, that's been done. In phase III the alerts are
runway specific, and that was part of the TDWR / LLWAS user group work that went into
simplifying that data and make it more precise so each runway would have a specific alert.
Q: HERB SCHLICKENMA_R (FAA) - In one of your charts, you showed the product-
level integration tests in '90. In it, you used TDWR precipitation to validate LLWAS
information. Could the ASR-9 precipitation product be introduced in lieu of the TDWR?
A: LARRY CORNMAN (NCAR) - The product level integration technique that I put
together doesn't care what the source is. So, in fact, right now with the wind shear
detection program going on with ASR-9 the product output from that system would look
identical to the TDWR output. Not only could the precipitation product be used in a similar
fashion but the detection of events with a bandaid in a sense would fall through.
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A Status Report on the TDWR Efforts in the
Denver Area
by
Wayne Sand
,If
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Research Applications Program
Abstract
A prototype radar developed by Raytheon as part of the NEXRAD program is
currently being operated in Denver, Colorado, by the National Center for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR). The Federal Aviation Administration has contracted NCAR to use
output from the radar to duplicate the wind shear detection capabilitiy of a a Terminal
Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) in an effort to continue development of TDWR
algorithms and to protect Stapleton Airport. NCAR's efforts as they relate to the
ground-based wind shear detection program will be summarized. The presentation
will include a discussion relating in-flight microburst encounters to the severity of the
events as detected by the TDWR system. Controllers' and pilots' perceptions of the
system, overall detection and false alarm statistics from the system, and microburst
alarm threshold logic will be discussed.
* NCAR is sponsored by the National Science Foundataion
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Denver Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR)
Geographical Setting
/_ LONGMONT
ARTCC/CWSU
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Project Summary
1990 Denver TDWR
Program
Shakedown Period: 1-31 May
Operational Period: 1 June-7 Sept
Products Delivered:
=It
=!=
TDWR/LLWAS Integrated
Alarms
Gust front Detection and
Prediction
LLWAS Operational Winds
Precipitation
Storm Motion
(Reflectivity)
Nowcast Product
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Operational Summary:
Hardware Problems
Two days down due to
Radar hardware failure,
other minor problems due
to hardware and software
Weather events within 5 nm
of the Airport center
> Microburst
95 Events (30-70 Kts)
17.6 Hours
(50 affected the
airport) .
Wind shear w_th loss)
159 Events (1.5-30
> Wind shear w,th ga,n
65 Events (15-45
kts)
kts)
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4t Performance of the system,
quick look
> Greater than 90% POD
> Less than 5% FAR
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1990 OPERATIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS
USER INTERFACE ASPECTS
NOTIFICATION OF 1990 OPERATIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS
• PRESEASON AIRLINE BRIEFING
• LEI"FER TO AIRMEN
• NOTAMS
• PILOT QUESTIONNAIRES
• NOTIFICATION ON ATIS
• ATC TRAINING SESSIONS
PILOT REACTIONS
• FEWER OPERATIONS DURING MBAs; HOWEVER SOME STILL
OCCUR
• FEWER TAKEOFFS WITH 15 KT LOSS ALERTS
PILOT QUESTIONNAIRES
• PROVIDES PILOTS A MEANS TO COMMENT ON SYSTEM
• VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE RESPONSE
• PILOTS REPORT "SIGNIFICANT" WIND SHEAR ENCOUNTERS
BEGINNING AT 10 KTS
ANALYSIS EFFQRTS TO REDUCE "NUISAN(;E" ALARII_
• 15 KTALARMS
• MODIFICATIONS TO WIND SHEAR WARNING BOXES
• REDUCTION IN SIZE OF MB SHAPES
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Summary, 89 and 90
Activities at Denver:
1. Continued development and
improvement of TDWR/LLWAS
Integration
2. Demonstrated Terminal NEXRAD
concept in 1989, program canceled
3. Considerable Interaction with
other groups for a better
understanding of the July 11,
1988 Microburst Case
> Numerous papers in the
literature
> See DOT/FAA/DS-89/19
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4. Reasonably good agreement of
f-factor calculations from Radar
with those derived from Aircraft
5. Continued development of
Nowcasting and Convective
Initiation
> Primary users at Center and
TRACON
> Prefer Convective Initiation
and Storm Motion Vectors
6. Continued development of
Tornado Detection and Forecasting
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7. Continued examination of User
Interface issues
Threshold for warnings (15
Kts)
Size of warn=ng areas (Alarm
boxes and alarm shapes)
> Perceived over warning
> Terminology
8. Reliable operations during
1990
9. System performance statistics
more than acceptable
10. Runway Extension LLWAS is
providing good coverage farther
from the threshold
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11. Enhanced understanding of the
relationships between ground
based and airborne systems
expected during the 1991 tests
with the NASA Aircraft flying in
the Denver area
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The 11 July 1988 M[croburst at
Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado
K. L. Elmore, M. K. Politov;eh, and W. R. Sand
National Center for Atmospheric Research z
P. O. Box 3000
Boulder, Colorado 8030T
I. Introduction
During the early afternoon of 11 July 1988, while
the Terrains/ Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) Opera-
tional Test and Evaluation (aT&E) wM underway, thun-
derstorms formed over the mountains west of Denver, Col.
orado, and moved eastward over the pl=;ns. By 21302,
several cells approached the Denver area. One of the more
vigorous of these was roosted just northwest of Stapleton
International Airport. It produced the most inten,e nil.
croburst - 35m s -t differential - investigated to date using
dual-Doppler radar techniques,
The TDWR microbur_t a/arm s/erred air tra_c con-
tr_;!ers to the hazard from 2206--?748. During this time, 4
commercial passenger aircraft pc"on(rated this m/crnburst,
brtunatdy ,6_hoat inodent.
The m_croburst reached the ground meverd km
soutbea.st of the main precipitation shal't o[ the etocm.
"Fhls b_havior differs from that of most mlcr_bar_ cue
studies reported prevlousiy (Fu_ta 1985). The evolution
of the microbumt ,rill be exam/ned in this study. Details
not contained in this paper ,,'il be included in the poster
session.
IT. Data Sources
The primary data sets used in this study summary
come from 2 Doppler radars operated ,,, part of the TDWR
OT&E. The M.,-sachusetts lusts tute of Technology Lincoln
Laboratory 10-ca wavelength Doppler radar (FL2) wu
used u the project fast-bed instrument. The University of
North Dakota (UND) G-am Doppler radar, located •bout
21 km norgh 04"FT_, also gathered data. Scanning patterns
of the t,m radaro ,ma'e coordinated to enable dual-Dopplec
p_st-snalysl= o*_r the alrp_t area (fee Fig. I). Coordi-
nated volume _sarm _ o_mpk4ed every 2.5 rain. The
_owest effective elevation auq_ _am 0.3" from both FL2
and UND, p_adng the beam ¢tmtecs app_wlmately 190 m
ab_,_ the center of the ah'po_. Over the alrp_, bo_h
beam1 m_se roughly 1SO m in diameter.
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FIGURE 1. /,ocafio_ of mda_'s, .a_mce meso.e_ _tatio-* and
lhe C_.A$S launeA siledu,'m_ _Ae 1988 TDWR OTSE alSla-
ptefo, lnferaafioaal Ai,'_,4, De,toe,', Col,,',do Th, air_o,'4
_n_al_S a_ a/_o sko_n. TEn mie_l*aest oatline (divergence >
tO m s-_over • distance < 4 km) near _he _urface at _I_. i_
sang-/reposed.
Surface and upper air t_ermodynsmie and wind
measurements wen also used in this study. The
FAA-Lincoln Laboratory Operational Weather Studies
(FLOWS) reasoner (Wolfson et d. 1987), consisting of
22 stations, ,,m in place in and •round the airport area.
This wM supplemented by the 12-station Low Level Wind
Alert System (LLWAS), which meamu'ed winds near the
airport runways. A Croes-chaln Lor•n Sounding System
(CLASS) launch site wu located •t the Denver National
Weather Service OFRce adjacent to Stapleton Airport.
t NCAR is sp, n,ored $y _e National Sole.ca Fan, rialto,
All _imes a_ UTC.
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Ill. Meteorological Conditions
The major synoptic scale weather feature on 11 July
1988 was a slowly-eastward-movlng shallow trough over the
western United States. This feature wu barely discernable
at 70 kPa and rsnished above that level. Winds were gen.
eraNy westerly and were less than I0 m s -I at all levels
over Colorado. Wyoming and Utah. This westerly flow
ad:'ectedmoisture into the Den_r ares, which increased
in a deep layerextending from just above the surface to
o_r 12 krns. A maximum of 1.05 cm of totalpreclpitshle
writerwgs measured by the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration's 6.channel microwave radiometer
at Stapleton Airport between 2200 and 2230.
Prior to the storm, cond;t|_, rlear the 'u/race were
typicaJ of those accompanying mlcrobursts observed in the
[ntermountain West (Caracena and Flueek Ig87). The
temperature-dewpoint spread at the surface wu 20 - 25°C,
with s nearly dry adiabatic temperature lapse rate from
the surface to 4.8 kin. Above that, a layer of moist air wu
present. There was margin ,.I moist convective instability,
with a Lifted index of -2.
Equivalent potential temperature (0.) is plotted
against height in Fig.. 2 for 2 CLASS soundings preced-
ing the storm. Above the moist layer, the atmosphere it
quite dry and @. decreases. At 7.2 km, s sharp absolute
minimum 9, of 326 K is present in the 2004 sounding, and a
relative minimum exists between 4.8 and S.0 kin. The min-
imum 8. occur* at the level of t 2 "C temperature inversion,
the base of which has a temperature of - 20"C. Although
saturated parcels originating between 7.4 km and around
4.8 km are potentially cold and will accelerate downward,
the coldest parcels will originate around 7.3 km end just
below 5 km.
Three basic flow regimes exist: lightand variable
winds from the surfaceup to5 kin,westerly winds between
5 and 7 kin, and northwesterly winds above 7 kin.
IV. Analysis
a. Dual-Doppler /InolyliJTecKniquel
The CEDRIC analysis package (Mobr et at. 1986) is
used foe three-dlmensionai wind ftetd synthesis and analy-
ale. Fourteen volumes were analysed, from 2148 through
2220. The analysis has 400 m hoHsontal and ,500 m ver-
tlcal grid spicing. The domain extends from 1.8 -10.8 km
(0.19 - 9.19 km AGL) vertically, and 2 - 30 km west, 1 -
23 km north of FL2 horlsontally. Stapleton Airport is
roughly centered in this grid; the microburst impacted on
the southeast edge of the airport, well-centered in the anal-
ysis domain (see Fig. I).
Raw input Doppler velocities _re corrected for a
deduced storm motion of 10 m I -t from 270"; resulting
analyses shows ground-relatlve winds.
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FIGURg 2. Elides|eat pe|eng,l tem_vedare (9,) sad _o,_r_ntal
w/nd_ ai ff.J i'm I'eso|ulien pteild ailoilul #leSlhl fi'_m Ihe f700
and 1004 UTC CLA$5 soundinls.
A 0he-pass Cressman obj_tive analysis ,cheme was
used (Eros*men 1959) to map rullal velocity components
from sphetqca] coordinates1o gHdded Car[_'i]ihspace. Be-
fore a conllstent u_ component was eaiculated, the horlron-
tal winds were filtered with 5 puses of I two- dlmensions.I,
three-point smoother (Shuman 1955). The resulting anal-
yses have 2 km horlsontal spatial resolution at the hsJf-
amplitude points.
b. Micrebursi evolution
The microburst-pi_ludnli complex originated i'rom
two 60+ dBZ, cells which formed around 2130 over the
mountains 34 km west of Stapleton. These cells grew and
moved southeutward.
By 2147, I llne of convergenee -loft w_ observed
near _.6 kin, oriented northwest.mutheast and moving to
the southeast. Reflectivlty at that level increased just
west of Stipleton Airport at 2155, and shortly ifterwardl
FL2 detected large-scale cTelonlc shear ,it 48 km ovel
the airport. Surface winds during thll time were north.
northeasterly across the airport with temperatures of 31-
32"C tcrols the FLOWS memnet. The air was fairly dry
with 22-25% _lsti,e humidity (P,Jt).
As the storm approached Stapleton Airport, the
highest radar reRectivity within the storm wu above 93
km and slightly greater than 40 dBZ..
_ m
! All #leithii =re IdSL.
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At 2L58, 3 reflectivity cores can be identified within
'.h_ analysis domain, shown in Fig 3a. Core A is the west.
ernmost core extending to the surface. Cores B and C
are contained in the comma-shaped region well .loft and
so,ttheaat of core A (both cores are contained in an ares
o6 greater than ,33dBZ,). Core C was associated with the
s_r,_ngest updraft in the analysis domain, 21 m s -t, and
,,va.s responsible for the strongest microbu_t. The perspee-
tiv- _Jsed for these flg_tres somewhat obscures core C at this
time
k plume of hydrometeors forms s "bridge" of re-
flectivity which extends downwind (_nds near the radar-
detected storm top are from the northwest) from the 3
cores. The updrafts within the cores appear to have pen-
etrated into the layer of northwesterly winds above T ks,
carrying the hydrometeors to the southeast.
Although no direct measurements of the hydromete-
ors are available for this storm, previous studies in north-
eastern Colorado thunderstorms (e.g., Dye et at. 1074)
-S
FIGURg 3A. Three-dimension41reflecfieitypee#pecfit,e tnewsof
the microbnv.Bl.prodt_cin t _oes,n of I! luly 1988. The e,iewe_, im
Ioelrin 5 iotua_l the norlht,_i and im laeafe_ lO I_n west and 78
km 2auth a/FL_ and iJ 19.1 &m MSL. T&e _3 dBZ, iR cantou_d
a_ e_e_l O J _ AGL. A_wJ depicl air pa_d t_ecta_ea dav-
in_ #he 2, J sin |he sol, me anallf#i.,= r_p_Jenla, Anallfai_ lime
is centeredat _tJ_ _T_.
FIGtIRE 3B. Same as Fir. 3e, 6ui foe S_02 UT_.
FIGURE 3C. Same _ Fill Ja, $,_| Joe _I_ _T_',
suggest that they were Likelygra,_¢,q. Th,. !_fl.,d -_._don
sstion lea'elfrom the 2004 so,_nding ha_ a temp_'rac_r" _f
-0.5"C. and the temperature at the echo t_p least is ar_d
-20 °C, both typical of clouds in the area in which ice phase
precipitation pro<e_ses _'e dominant.
Core A descended to the surface first, w,'ll w,.ot _f
the airport area, and'represents the main precipitation area
of the storm. It produced a weak, [srge-sc.le o,_tfl_w
By 2202 cores B and C had alms extended d_wnward
to the surface (see Fig. 3b). Core [3 produced a. *mail
outflow region to the southeast of Stapleton AirporL which
was First evident muma 10 m s -_ wind speed difTerentiai in
the dual-Doppler analysis at 2203.
By 2205, the refiectivlty bridge, shown in F_g 3b.
filled in and descended. Moat of it appears to have em-
anated from core C. The surface outflow from core C first
appeared at 2205. In 7 mln, by 2212. it had reached its
maximum strength of 32 m s -_. By this 6me the out_o_,
from core B is no longer evident.
The FLOWS mesonet station closestto the core C
microburst exhibited a temperature drop of 6"C (29 _o
23"C), • windmpeed increue from 7' to 15 m s -I , and a
RH incre_e from 24 to 43_ between 220g and 2210.
The msln mlcroburst maintained a wind speed dif-
ferential above the TDWR microb_st criterion (at least
15 m s -t over md_stance of 4 km or less) until 2241, accord-
ing to dual Doppler analysis. By 2254 the differentia] had
decreased to less than I0 m s -_, the criterion for TDWR
wind shear regions. Eimore and McCarthy (19_;9) report
an averalge lifetime for mlcrobm'mts in the Denver area of
13 to 14 min, with a standard devlati_n of 75 min. This
microburst lasted 36 sin.
As the storm collapsed and d_sslpated, the sur-
face outflow became quite complex. A gust front, which
had been slowly approaching from the northwest, began
to interact with the microbur_t outflo_r. Several addi-
tional less-intense downdrarts merged with the original
main microburst, creating a large, complicated multiple-
microb_st outflow region.
The highest reflectiHties descended to the lowest lev-
els of the storm, unlike earlier an..lyses where they were
generally well aloft. Core C remains ;dentifia_>ie t'hro-ugh
the last dual-Doppler analysis time centered at 2220:47.
Temperature_ con tlnued to decreue slow I y t h rou g h-
out the FLOWS meeonet as the storm outflow covered the
ares. The storm complex eventually developed into a weak
line and moved southeast.
_. Air Pared _jeeto_l Analltsis
The history of the mlcroburst wu investigated more
thoroughly by computing tlr parcel trajectories backward
in time, starting at the time of the most intense outflow.
The CEDRIC analysis software used in the analyses sub-
tracts the fall speeds of hydromeleors from the calculated
tv values, estimated using the observed radar reflec_ivitles.
Thls approodmat_ the verticalmotions of sirparcels.
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Parcels within the main microburst at 22i2, at an
altitude of 2.2 km (400 m AGL), were tracked to the be-
ginning of the analysis period, 2148.
Tbree.dlmenslonaJ perspective views of resultant
trajectory ribbons are shown in Fig. 4. Each trajectory
terminus is labelled with a verticta bar, and a short duh
indicates where each of those bars intersects the surface.
The bars then continue downward until they reach 0 km.
Trajectory ribbons are illustrated such that rotation along
the path is indicated by twisting of the ribbon. Many more
trajectories than those displayed were examined, but these
are representative of most parcels within the microbu_t.
FIGURE 4. Air parcel tmjeeto_ca obtained jbem dual.Doppler
analysts. The tr_Iccfos,'iee a_ aho_ in these dimenmwna ,m'_dh
proyections on a honzordal phne indle=|ed, gach hck mar l
also t • trajecto,'_ _6$on indicates JO s of/race|.
Air within the mlcroburst at 2212 originates well
aloft and to the west of the surface outflow. All air parcel
trajectories remain confined to a narrow eut-west corridor
between about 5 and 7 km. Early in the analysis period,
there are 2 groups of trajectories: those at midlevels Fell
west of the airport and those that are slowly ucendlng
further to the eut. These groups merge between 2158 and
2200 at a height of 5 to 7 km, where they intersect the
developing refleetivlty region. By 2202, the air parcel tra.
jectories are clearly within the region of reflectivity greater
than 33 dBZo and have begun to descend, u shown in Fig.
3b. After this time, the region of high reflectivlty rapidly
descends and the downdraft aecderates until it impacts the
surface between 2210 and 2212, creating the mJcroburst.
Other trajectories (not shown) indicatecJ that none
of the parcels within the mtan microburst originated above
6.25 Era, or above the minimum #. level. Further trajectory
analyses, initiated from the first radar volume and c-lcu -
laced forw-ard in time, sh_ed that air putels originating
above about 7.2 km did not tend to descend. In general,
it is likely that no actual sir parcels originating above the
minimum #, levd descended to the sudace during this mi-
croburst. Yet, it is quite clear that the hydrometeors did
come from above T.2 km.
The re&ion responsible for most of the cooling and
downdraft acceleration is the broad area of low 0° located
between 5 and 7 km. It appears that the hydrometeors
were carried ahead of the rt_on of active convection and
into this area of low #e, where rapid sublimation and evapo-
ration cooled the air within s narrow vertical Layer, inten-
sified the downdraft and created the strong, long-luting
rnicrobmet at the surface. Visual observations confirmed
that the mJcroburst appeared to have descended from Lloft
and southeut of the main part of the storm, rather than
through the most intense precipitation region.
V. Conc[udlng Remarks
Figure 5 shows • simplified schematic ev,q,J6_o _f
the main microbutlt, combining the interaction gait, e4
by following the trajectories of hydrometeors and _f air
parcels, u discussed in the previous section.
l_ydrometeors formed and were carried up=ard ;o
severa.l strong convective updrafts that e_sted i_ a r-gila
where envlronmentta _nds were generally l_ght. The _v
drometeors continued to grow until they became too h,avv
to be supported by the updrafts and began slow_7 falling.
Strong northwesterty winds near the top of th," ,_pdraft
carried the hydrometeor plume southeut of the active ,,'_n 1
vection. Thus, u they descended, the hydrometeors w,'re
carried beyond the main precipitation ares of the storm
into t level of low O, air. Liquid water evaporated an4
frozen hydromeleors sublimated within a relatively shal-
low layer, causing the air to become negatively buoyant,
whereupon the cooling air accelerated rapidly down,card
to produce a microburst at the surface.
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11 JULY SCHEMATIC TRAJECTORY
FIGURE 5. A sc&ematic diagram depicting the eeolt_(ion of particle _rajeciorics responsible/or |lie 11 July
T_te sa_ndinf |o the left _houss 0 e near the time of the mierobur*(. Three.dlmensional _inds a/aft are displayed a
the fifure,
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Controller and Pilot Decision Maidng
in Transmitting and Receiving Microburst Wind Shear Alerts
from an Advanced Terminal Wind Shear Detection System
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John McCarthy and Wayne Sand
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ABSTRACT
Apl=roximately 650 air ca.mer passenger fa_es caused _y Iow-aJtit_Ce ,Mnc_
she_ have ¢ccun'ed in the United States over _e past fifteen (15) years. "me mcs:
common form of lethal wind shear is the mi_ci=urst, a sCong downdraft and
horizontal outflow that occurs near the earth's surface.
During the past decade, a sophisticatedmimoburst detec_cn and warning
system has been clevelcpea using Doppler weather (wind-measuring) radar and an
array of surface wind sensors eithertogether or independently. This system is
capalcleof measuring the headwind-to-tailwindchange thata pene_TatJng aircraftis
likelyto anc_unter, and itprovides airtraffic_n_'cllerswith a simple hazard aJe_
intended for relay to pilots in the immec_iate takeoff or approac,h-to-la_ding mote.
The system is intenc_ed to induce an early avoidance decision on the pan of _e
fligt_ crew, thus avoiding a poter_aily catas'c_phic wind shear acc_der¢ The FeCerai
Avia_cn Admini_Izal_on (FAA) will place this system at approximmely 50 ma_cr U.S.
aimcr_ that experience mic_obur_ wind shear on a relatively frequent basis.
Operational demonstr_ons of this detec_cn and warning system in the
summers of 1987, 1988 and 1989 at Staplet_on Intema_onal Airport, Denver,
Colorado, provided substanl_ exl=edence regarding air Izaffic c_nt_tler and pilot use
of this new system. This paper descnbes three severe mimcl=urst events ra_ging in
to_l wind speed change from :35 to 95 knots, headwind-to-taiiwind. Typical alpine
policy f_r flight crews receMng microbur_ aierl_ was clear:, make an immeCia_e
avoidance decision.
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Air traffic controller reactionvaded from a mechanicalrecitationof the alert
message imlsedded in a routine clearanceto lancl (normal procedure) to an urger.:
relay cf a muc_ stronger hazard messagefollowed by a request of the pilot to 'say
intention,' rather than saying "clearedto land." Pilot reac_ons varied from an
immediate decision to avoid the hazardous event (thus totally missing the micrc_urst)
to a conscious decision to penetrate the microburst in spite of a clear
acknowledgment of the alert.
Human factors related to the ergonomics of these situations are explored, as
well as air traffic and flight standards policy issues.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Microburst2 wind shear accidents have been responsible for over 35 aircarrler
accidents in the United States since 1964, resui'dng in over 650 fatalities (I). In me
U.S., the most recent such accident was the crash of Delta Flight 191 at Dallas-Ft.
Worth Airport in Texas on 2 August 1985, which resulted in the loss of 137 lives. On
3 Septemt3er 1989, Culoana de Aviacion Flight 3046 crashed on takeoff from Havana,
Cuba, with the loss of 115 passengers and crew and 24 persons on the ground.
Evidence strongly suggested that the aircraft encountered a severe thunderstorm-
induced microburst.
Since the mid-1980s, the FAA, in conjunc'don @ several research
organizations, including the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and
the Massachusetts lns*dt_e of Technology (MIT) I.inc_in Laboratory, has devetopect a
wind shear detection and warning system that c_nsists of two separate wind sensor
systems. First developed in 1976, the Low-Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS)
recentty has been upgraded to detect microbursts. This new version of LLWAS,
capal_le of detecting microbursts, employs 11 to 16 anemometer and wind vane
wind- measuring sites situated in the runway proximity to detect diverging wind
features near the ground.
More recently, the FAA developed the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
(TDWR), which utilizes the wind-measuring capabilities of Doppler radar to detec':
microbursts in the airport terminal vicinity. Complete technical details of these
systems can be found in the references (2,5).
During the summers of 1987, 1988 and 1989, LLWAS and TDWR were tested
operationally at the Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado. In 1989, the
microiourst detection capability of both systems was integrated in a prototype
development phase to provide air oafftc oontrollers and pilots with simple,
unambiguous hazard alert messages. The TDWR system can detect microbursts
witln a higln degree of accuracy and with a low false-alarm rate. Specifically, for
microburst= having headwind/tailwind differences greater than 40 knots, the
probability of demctJorP is 98%, while the false alarm rate 4 is 4%. When a
2A microburst is an intense downdraft and associated outflow, located near the
earth's surface, that produces strong headwind-to-tailwind changes for an aircraft
which penetrates the phenomenon below 1,000 ft. AGL It is _picaJly situated within
thunderstorms but can often occur in less intense convective storms, particularly in
dry climates.
3The probability that a valid detection will be made by the system.
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micrcburst detection is made, the system automaticallygenerates a microburst aler':
and provides an alert message to a computer screen situatect in front of the air
traffic controller; the controller relays the alert to poterrdally affected flight crews in
either the takeoff Gr landing mode. A typical approach-to-landing alert reads:
UNITED 226, MICROBURST ALERT, EIGHT ZERO (80) KNOT LOSS ONE
MILE F]NAL THRESHOLD WIND TWO ONE ZERO AT TWO TWO KNOTS
A typical takeoff alert reads:
AMERICAN 330, MICROBURST ALERT FOUR ZERO (40) KNOT LOSS ON
THE RUNWAY DEPARTURE END WiND THREE THREE ZERO ONE TWO
KNOTS
During the prototype operationaltests of the system, aircan'_ersdeveloped
comparry policy regarding flightcrew use of these alerts. In most cases, flightcrews
were provided with flightsafety bulletinsthat typicallystated:
FLIGHT CREWS SHALL NOT CONDUCT AN APPROACH TO LANDING OR A
TAKEOFF WHILE A MICROBURST ALERT IS IN EFFECT.
In addition,airtrafficontrollerswere instructedto provide allflightcrews with
the alertmessage whenever an aircraftmight be affected by the microbumt.
However, since inbound flightsnormally contacted the airtrafficontrollerat ¢r near
the finalapproach fix,the microburst alertwas most often issued in association with
the landing clearance. On takeoff,the alertwas typicallyissued at the time cf takeoff
clearance.
These two demonstrations were prototypical,and while airtrafficontrollers
and pilotsgenerallywere aware of the operationalcapabilityand associated
procedures of the system, itwas a new, unique system. Consequently, permanent
conclusions about airtrafficontrollerand pilotuse of thissystem are somewhat
speculative.
In thispaper, three microburst events inwhich validmicroburst alertswere
issued by airtrafflcontrollersare examined for the purpose of identifyinghuman
factoraspects of these alerts.Conclusions and recommendations for possible
actions are addressed at the end of the paper.
4The probability that an alarm is false.
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2. EXAMINATION CF THREE MICRCBURST ALERT INCIDENTS
Three microburst incidents are described briefly, followed by a Cescdpticn cf
;eninent human famcrs elements:
11 July 1988
At approximately 1600 hours (all times are localdaylight time), a micrccurs'_
developed at 1-mile final to runways 28 Left and 26 Right. TDWR was the cniy
operating system; in 1988 the LLWAS and TDWR systems were not yet integrated.
The event initially was detected as a 35-knot loss; it then drifted east and intens_eC
to an 80-knot loss at a 3-mile final. The Geographic Situation Display (GSD) for this
event is shown in Fig. 1. The situation steadily intensified for approximately 8
minutes until it began to dissipate. Five air carrier jet transports were in vadcus
approach locations at the time, and they received a microlourst alert outside the
outer marker greater than 3 miles from the runway (4). Figure 2 shows the ver_cal
profile of four of these flights dunng their go-around sequence. The following is a
sequential summary of each flight:
F!ight862 (B-737-200) made an immediate avoidance decision based on 40-
knot loss microl_urstalert.The pilotstated thathe did not want to make an
approacln when a microiourstalertwas in effect.
Flight 395 (B-737-200) was given a 40-knot loss microburst alert at a 1-mile
final. The aircraft continued the approach to a missed approach, reaching its
lowest point at 50 ft AGL approximately three-quarters of a mile short cf the
runway. This aircraft encountered the most severe wind shear.
Flight236 (DC-8) was given a 50-knot microbumt alertand continued the
approac..h;itencountered severe headwind-tailwind fiuctuationsas seen in
indicated airspeed. The flightcrew executed a missed approach and
descended to near 250 R AGL
Flight 949 (B-727) continued the approach but made an early missed
approach after receiving a microburst alert of a 70-knot loss 3-mile final.
aircraft did not descend below approximately 500 ft AGL
The
Right 305 (B-727) received a microburst alert indicating an 80-knot loss 3-mite
final. The crew elected to miss the approach just inside the outer marker.
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The following are the pertinent ,'acts associated with P, ese air _ra_c ccn=c_lers
micrcl:;urst alert messages:
The first two flights were handled by cne air traffic controller. All alerts were
given as arccrcpdate, in the vicinity of the cu_er marker. In these _,ve cases.
the alerts were issued with a clearance to land.
The lastthree fligl'r_swere handled _y a second airtrafficontrollerwho
relievedthe firstc,_nt_ollerdue to a watch change. The thirdaircraftin
sequence (Flight236) was issued an alertalong with a clearance to land.
The fourr_ aircraft (Flight 949) was issued a microburst alert in the _iind
without a lancting c_earance. In this case, the automatic alert appeared cn the
controller's display, and the controller issued the alert to all aircraft monitoring
the frequency, including Flight 949.
The c¢n_oller issued the most severe microl3urst alert (80-knot Ices) to Fiight
305, fotlcwed by "say request" rather than "cleared to land."
There were no additional approaches following these first five aircraft; Cue to
the microl_urstevent,the trafficwas diverted from the airportfor 30 minutes untilthe
weather improved.
8 July 1989
TDWR was not operational on this clay. The Enhanced U.WAS system,
utilizing 16 wind-measuring sites, proteCed $tapleton Airport. This system included
additional sensors sited to protect the final approach corridors out to 3 miles from
the end of the runway. At approximately 1720 hours, a microtsurst occurred at the
north end of the airport on the approach end of runways 17 Left and Right; this
event is illustrated in Rg. 3. The following describes the experience of Flight 531:
After being cleared for a visual approach, the captain heard three microburst
alerts. The first one indicated a 60-knot loss on a 2-mile final. He continued
the approach. Shortly thereafter, the captain heard a second alert, indicating
a 95-knot loss 3-mile final. They initiated a missed approach at al_out a 3-mile
final and did not actually experience the event until about a .5-mile final, when
they lost 50 knots indicated airspeed and also lost 400 feet in altitude wl_ile
experiencing moderate turl=ulence. The missed approach was initiated at
approximately 600 ft AGL; the event was encountered at approximately 1,0C0
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ft AGL with a subsequent loss of 4_0 fL 5
The air traffic controller/pilot interac'_en can be summarized as fellows:
"Fne air traffic controller first had an indicationof microburst activity: a 35-knot
loss on a 2-mile final. When he delivered the alert to Flight 531, the captain
asked for sulostantiating pilots' reports from other aircraft operating these
runways. He queded an aircraft that had just landed on Runway 18 (located
about 1 mile west); the pilot indicated a 30-knot loss on that approach. "lnis
report was heard by the captain of Flight 531 and apparently was used by
Flight 531 to consider a missed approach. The controller continued to
provide microburst reports to Flight 531 and following aircraft.
Approximately 15 aircraft did not land subsequent to the missed approach of
Flight 531. Most aircraft landed at Denver following a hold of approximately 20
minutes; one aircraft diverted to another airport located approximately 60 miles to the
south of Denver.
2 Seotember 1989
On this day, a microburst was detected by the integrated "rDWR/LLWAS
system at 1-mile final to Runways 26 Lett and Right. The integrated TDWR/LLWAS
system issues consolidated alarms based on products from each independent
system. The following describes the flight sequence for two flights, 914 and 2235:
Flight 914, first in line for the approach, received a microburst alert, for 35-
knot loss 1-mile final. The captain elected to continue the approach. The
event reappeared on the controller's display as a 30-knot loss 1-mile final.
The crew con'dnued _e approach after a direct question from the air traffic
corrColler querying whether the flight wished to continue the approach. The
flight landed with major difficulty, experiencing a 5 g landing that caused
structural damage. The captain, upon exiting the actNe runway, confirmed the
microburst and further recommended ciosing of the runway due to unsafe
wind shear conditions.
Right 2235 followed Right 914, continued the approach but elected to execute
a missed approach on short final.
5The captain stated in a post-incident debdef that the wind shear equipment was
very good and felt that in this event itprobably saved his aircraft.
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The air traffic controller experience is summarized:
The icten_cation of the microburst was dear, and all alerts were issued. Th,,e
controller, in the case of the first aircraft, queried the flight crew regarcing t,",eir
landing intentions, confirming that they wished to land during a microrcurst
alert.
3. ANALYSIS
Several analyses have been conducted for these three events, although only
the first one (11 July 1988) has undergone extensive analysis (5"). NCAR pa_cipateC
in crew debriefings on the 11 July 1988 and the 8 July 1989 events. The fcllcwing
general ana.hFica| comments apply:
11 July 1988
1. The microl=urst was accurately detected and alerts were issued by two air traffic
controllers. However, there was a significant c_ifference in the imperative tcne
I_etween the first and second controller; the second controller used a mere definitive
tone of voice.
2. The second controller, upon recognizing the urgency of the alert information,
used his controller's discretionary function not to issue a c_earance to land fcr the
fourth aircraft (Right 949). He went further for Flight 305 and added "say request."
In this case, we believe that the added query was instrumental in the flight crew's
subsequent missed-approach decision.
3. The flight crews typically were unfamiliar wittl airline policy for micmburst
avoidance and _ the airline flight bulletin describing the operation= demcnsVaticn.
In this regard, it must be recognized that this first-of-a-Kind operational test cannot
be expected to be well understood by most flight crews. However, the first aircraft
(Flight862) c_eady was familiar_ policyand made an earlyavoidance decision.
4. Several aircraft used microburst wind shear recovery techniques (6) during the
missed approaches, indicating the value of these techniques; this might have saved
Flight 395 from disaster.
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8 July 1989
1. The E,_hanced U.WAS performed flawlessly in this event, detec*Jng a very Cr/
environment microburst when there were no visual clues for either the flights invcivec
or _e air traffic tower controllers. It should be noted that *,.he 95-knot ',css meas;r=.c
by this system was the strongest microt:urst ever measured by a_,y micrciourst
Cetec'Jcn system.
2. The controller exercised good judgment by querying adjacent flicshts for wind
shear reports. His ac'dons serve as a model for controller handling of wind shear
events.
3. The crew of Flight 531 exercised outstanding judgement and used flight deck
crew coordination (as determined in the crew del:det) to make a consensus
avoidance decision upon hearing the 95-knot loss alert.
2 Septeml:er 19_9
1. This micrc:t:urst event was just above the headwind/tailwind threshold for
declaring a diverging shear microburst. The event was well detected just al:ove _'e
threshold that indicates a severe wind shear condition. This is confirmation that a
30-knot threshold is an appropriate one, given that the landing aircraft experienced
structural damage.
2. The controller strongly suggested, by his queries, that Right 914 should give
serious consideration to an avoidance action (they did not take the suggestion). It
should be noted that the controller did not state "say request" or "say interrdon" as
did the controller on 11 July 1988.
3. The crew of Right 914 made a clear choice to land the aircraft contrary to airline
policy and after informal prompting from the controller. The aircraft easily could have
been lost.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA13ONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The LLWA8, TDWR and integrated TDWR/LLWAS microlourst alert systems are
a technical success. Once a divergent wind shear event reaches the microburst
threshold of an expected 30-knot headwind-to-taliwind differential, the systems worn
extremely well and produce alarms whict-! are accurate and timely.
The human favors aspects are less successful, and it is in this domain that
considerable additional effort is needed. Right crews continue to need extensive
training regarding _e impact of microl:ursts on aircraft and the inadvisal:ility of
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penel:'ating them; standard procedures are needed to reinforce the training. In
adc_iticn, improved air traffic controller training is needed to standardize controller
res_cnse to micrel3urst alerts. From the 13erspecS"ve of the sclerosis who have
examined the basic science of microbursts and helped to develop detection
ca_a_ili_es, air traffic control rules and procedures that dictate avoidance are a
required next step. Such rules should be consistent _ onl3oard wind shear
avoidance avionics equipment.
Controllers could help sensitize pilots to making time-critical decisions by
using terminology that triggers the need for a pilot decision based on the presence
of a hazardous weather event. The air traffic service should consider testing a
cautionary message of "say request" or "say intentions" to encourage strongly a fligr.:
crew avoidance decision. This message will need to be examined to see if it adds
to controller workload or has o_er deleterious impacts.
Finally, accurate and timely microlourst wind shear alerting equipment is
I::eccming operational in the U.S. Its international use at airports where microt:ursts
are common would be critic,al to a major mitigation of this hazard worldwide.
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Fig. 1
11 July 11188, 1612 local time, geographic event display of the $tapleton Airpor_
runways w/th 3 nm extensions off each runway end and microburat events areas
shown by ellipses. The 80 knot microburst is shown at it's peak intensity located
off the approach end of runway 26.
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I_g. 3
8 July 1989, 1620 local time, plan view of the runways and three mile runway
extensions off all runway ends. The ortgin of the wind vectors represent the
location of the Enhanced LLWAS sensors, the an'ows show the direction toward
which the wind is blowing and the length and the numbers represent the wind
velocity In knot._. The 95 knot event on the approach to runway 17 is cteariy
shown to the north of the airport.
345
A Status Report on the TDWR Efforts in the Denver Area
Questions and Answers
Q: ANDY PECZALSKI (Honeywell SRC) - What is the percentage of dry/clear air wind
shear and microbursts that are marginally or not detectable by radar at your test site in
summer and in winter? Where could I get this information?
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - Try as we could we couldn't recall the exact number and
I'm not sure that we have an exact reference for you either. As best we can recall the
number is of the order of 5% that were less than -10 dBZ, which went into some of the
requirements for the sensitivity on the TDWR specification to build the system. That is part
of the answer and some of it is buried away in a lot of different sources that looked at these
kind of events. Of course if there's real low reflectivity and you don't have any other
evidence you're not really sure you missed the thing. You're not even sure it's there. Of
course when you have them fight on the airport it's somewhat easier. We have one known
event at the airport in '88 that was clearly missed because of low reflectivity. It was
detected by the LLWAS system and totally missed by the TDWR. A number of people
were standing there watching it, including the chairman of the NTSB. In the TDWR, the
spec as I understand it, is -20 dBZ sensitivity at 30 kilometers. That's how the problem is
being approached.
Q: DAVE HINTON (NASA Langley) - You indicated that pilots were concerned with a 10
to 15 knot airspeed loss. As Professor Hansman pointed out a 10 knot airspeed loss will
require wind divergence of at least 20 knots, more depending on the diameter of the event.
Could you elaborate on how you use pilot comments concerning airspeed loss to establish
TDWR alarm thresholds that are based on wind divergence.
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - Well, fundamentally this is input from the TDWR/LLWAS
user working group which consisted of a number of pilots and controllers and other people
associated with the problem. It was counsel received from airline operations, pilots, all of
those kinds of people that said they wanted to know when the system detected a 15 knot
event. We're still troubling with that threshold value. We're getting feed back from pilots
saying they're experiencing what they consider to be significant wind shear events with a
10 knot change. So it's a debatable issue. We set that threshold based on "professional"
input from people who thought they knew what they wanted. We continue to assess that
threshold.
Q: FRED REMER (University of North Dakota) - I believe that people axe avoiding wind
shear at Denver but the problem there has been well publicized. How are they responding
at other locations?
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - Generally, pretty good. What we're getting back on
questionnaires from Orlando this year and from Kansas City last year is generally
favorable. The pilots are reacting to that and we see the curve going in the fight direction
there, at least in our opinion. We have more people avoiding things that are called
microbursts everywhere.
Q: FRED REMER (University of North Dakota) - ATC is an active participant in the
Denver TDWR program, how would you qualify their participation?
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - They are very active participants. The people in Denver are
a good group to work with. The air traffic controllers, supervisors, and the center weather
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serviceunitpeopleareall veryinterestedinwhat'sgoingonandtheyall havealot to say.
I'd like tothinkwelistento all thosepeopleandcertainlyconsiderall of theirinput.
Q: FREDREMER(Universityof NorthDakota)- WhatI foundinFloridais thatthey're
notableto handlethesituationbeforeagustfrontoramicroburstoccurs.Forexample,a
gustfrontcomesthroughandall theairlinersthatwerelinedup,taxidownto theotherend
of therunwayandgetreadyfor departure.Thentheshearisgoneandwehave
environmentalconditionsagainandtheytaxibackdownto theotherendof therunwav
wheretheywereoriginally.SothequestionI wasaskingis, aretheyableto accommodate
that?Do theypredictthat?
A: WAYNE SAND(NCAR)- In aword,yes. In Denver,they'velearnedhowtodeal
with that.This 10and20minutewindshiftpredictionproduct,whichgivesthema
velocityvectorof thewindto beexpectedbehindthegustfront,is usedbythesupervisors
todecidewhento changerunwaysandif runwaychangeswill berequired.Theyin fact
will starttaxiingpeopletodifferentrunways.They'llsay,hey,wecantakeairplanesupto
thisguy,therestof youguysgoto theotherrunway,whateverit is. In myview they're
gettingverygoodatusingthatwindshiftpredictionproducto reconfiguretheairport.
Denver,of course,isa little bitdifferentthanOrlando,withorthogonalrunways.
UNKNOWN- The LLWAS winds are on the GSD for the traffic supervisor at Denver.
They were not put on the GSD in Orlando. So that the display of a wind map from
LLWAS, which makes the runway management more effective, was not available at
Orlando.
WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - That's another word to speak for integration at some level.
Putting those wind vectors on the GSD very rapidly builds confidence in the wind shift
algorithm.
STEVE CAMPBELL (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) - We did have the wind shift prediction
product at Orlando this past summer. Part of the problem may be that the people at Orlando
haven't had as much use, or maybe hadn't built up a confidence factor yet, whereas it's
been available in Denver for the past couple of years. It's worth noting, one of the main
economic justifications for TDWR is the ability to predict these wind shifts. It's one of the
things that controllers in general seem very enthusiastic about along with the storm motion.
WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - A lot of these new enhancements that are coming along for the
system are pretty well received. I think from day one at Denver, when we started putting
up wind shift products they were well received. They figured out right away how to use
that. It was very quick. But, as John pointed out, it probably has something to do with the
vectors that are on there from all the LLWAS sites. That gives them a lot of confidence in
whafs going on.
Q: ROBERT OTTO (Lockheed) - It was stated that there is "reasonably" good agreement
between calculations of F-factor from radar and those from aircraft. Please clarify. What
are the quantitative comparison numbers and how are they determined?
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - There is some arm waving that goes into that. You have to
make some assumptions about the vertical motions. What's used to do that is the
continuity equation. It's coming down, it's got to change directions and go the other way.
So it's a continuity argument used to compare between the two terms in that equation, the
horizontal term and the vertical term. There are a number of people who have attacked that
problem. We've done some of that at NCAR, the people here at NASA Langley have done
quite a bit of it, and the people out at NASA Ames, Rod Wingrove, has done some of those
347
kinds of things. There is some literature now that discusses those kinds of things. You
saw a number of those displays yesterday and today where you're looking at radar
computed F-factors versus airplane computed F-factors and generally those track pretty
well. I think that was the basis of my comment.
Q: PAUL ROBINSON (Lockheed) - This question relates to operational procedures
concerning TDWR procedures on the 11 July microburst encounters. My impression is
that the aircraft were only notified about the microburst after being cleared onto the
approach and pilot reports seem to be absent.
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - Absolutely true. They were absent. Bob Ireland is here
and that was one of the issues that came out of the United report. With that is a very strong
encouragement for pilots to give PIREPS. There were none in that event.
Q: PAUL ROBINSON (Lockheed) - Should the shear information have been
communicated to the pilots before being cleared onto the ILS?
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - The answer to that is probably yes. In fact, the way the
system was working then was that the information was available to the final controllers in
the tower and in the TRACON. Those are the people who are talking to them basically
before the outer marker. So the flight crews didn't have access to talk to somebody who
had the information available right in front of them until they were at the outer marker.
Now, based on that case and some additional effort that's gone on since then, there is a
little more activity in the TRACON with the supervisors now trying to get that information
to controllers. There are more displays of alpha numeric information in the TRACON so
that controllers have an option to look at that. But I don't believe there's still any obligation
to give that information out from the TRACON positions. It still is the responsibility of the
tower controller to give that information to the flight crews once they come over to tower,
which at Denver is typically about the outer marker. Were PIREPS available? No, they
just weren't available.
Q: ROLAND BOWLES (NASA Langley) - What is the termination criteria for TDWR
alerts?
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - It's a relatively simple termination criteria. It's when the
system senses that the total wind change across the detected event goes below 30 knots.
That is when the event terminates. Now the question is much more complex than it sounds
on the surface because by the time it gets to that point the event typically gets somewhat
bigger. The real question is, is that waiting too long because the level of shear hazard at
that point may be small. It's the delta V over delta R that's important to the airplane. The
delta R often times gets quite big. So it's a question of when you cut that off. At the
moment we're cutting it off when the delta V goes below 30 knots. That may or may not
be correct and that may be one of the ways we can also clean up the time that the system is
alarming. It's something that we continue to try and look at and we don't have an answer
for yet.
Q: BOB IRELAND (United) - For use in writing SAE-S7 standards for look-ahead
systems, please define dry conditions, e.g., dry microbursts, both in terms of reflectivity
and other parameters such as relative humidity.
A: WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - I don't know where you draw the line. The ends of the
spectrum are pretty easy but where you draw that line I don't know.
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UNKNOWN - To call it dry versus wet is arbitrary. You can draw a line anywhere you
want. The fact is, the spectra of microbursts go from very dry to very wet and it's
continuous.
WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - I'd hate to offer an opinion on that. I would refer back to the
analysis of the July 11 case for just a comment. Most of us think of July 11 as being a dry.
microburst, yet it was raining at the airport and there were reflecfiviries in the high 30s,
which starts to get up to crowding red on an airborne display. In that one we all refer to it
as dry, yet on many radars you'd have seen dots of red in that particular event. So. I
hesitate to draw that line standing up here on the podium. I don't know where it belongs.
BOB IRELAND (United) - That was probably a little unfair to ask you at the last minute. It
just came up last week at the S-7 meeting and we want to say in our document that we want
systems to work in both dry and wet conditions. We didn't feel that we had the collective
knowledge to draw a line, a reasonable line. We need to say that it's got to work from a
certain minimum to a certain maximum.
MARILYN WILSON (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) - The dry microburst was defined as
35 dBZ or lower because we looked at rain gauge measurement in Denver to see when
measurable precip was actually detected. For the drop size distributions found in the
Denver area, 35 dBZ was most commonly the line. ff the reflectivity was lower than that,
the rain gauge at the surface measured no rain. But, on a day like July 11, 1988, there was
measurable rain. So it's not a hard and fast thing. It depends on what that dBZ is giving
you. Those are also surface reflectivities. If you look aloft you could see a higher
reflectivity. That's sort of the maximum reflectivity at the surface. What the minimum
reflectivity at the surface is, no one has really catalogued.
BOB IRELAND (United) - I guess what I'm concerned about is, in the absence of
precipitation, is there still reflectivity? I'm talking about when there is not precipitation but
we have a dry microburst, what can we use as a measurement?
MARILYN WILSON (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) - There is precipitation there and there is
measurable reflectivity there, it's just that there's a few big drops and it skews this Z
number that the radar measures up to a higher reflectivity, like 20 dBZ, even though there
is nothing measurable by a rain gauge. There is rain in the air it's just sparse. There is also
dust in the air.
UNKNOWN - What we were trying to do on the S-7 committee was to define what an
airborne wind shear system must detect. For example, for the IR we picked up some
numbers as to the level of rain through which it must look. We needed the other side of the
equation for what a LIDAR must do and what a radar must do, in terms of what
performance it must meet from an airborne platform to be acceptable. So the question was,
if a number like 5% of microbursts are very, very dry, is that something that an airborne
radar must detect. Equally, must an IR or a LIDAR look through X rain? That's where we
were trying to go with it. We were trying to pick some numbers. Our committee was
concerned about what is it that our system has to do. Let's define some system
requirements. If people are going to be flying into Denver and if they've got an airborne
radar low level wind shear detection system and there are dry microburst, we've got some
specs for people to shoot at.
WAYNE SAND (NCAR) - It's certainly a fair question and I would suggest that that's
something we probably have to get our heads together between NCAR and Lincoln Labs,
at least, and try and provide you with a number. I think it's a matter of, as you say, setting
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a def'mition and somebody has to do it. Maybe we have more data than anybody else
between us to try to come up with that number. Let us get back to you for the committee
on that. We'll work the problem and see if we can come up with at least our best estimate.
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Background
I ii I
Microbursts + other factors
crash aircraft taking off or landing
close runways
cause delays
force alternative airport landings.
• Microburst detection, location and measurement
will enhance airport usage and safety.
Ntnl 
Microbursts,streams of rapidlymoving,downwardlydirectedair, are a principalcause of wind shear
hazards. The air withina microburstcools rapidlydue to water drop evaporationand meltinghail, both of
which maintain negative buoyancyin the air and propel it to the ground. Microburstsare always associated
withcloudsand principallywith severe convective storms,though microburstshave been observedbeneath
virga-likeprecipitation. Microburstsare typicallyellipticalin shape and initiaterelativelyhigh in the
atmospherewhere heavily water-laden air can have diameters of ten km or more. The negatively-buoyantly
maintained rapiddownward acceleration of thiswater-laden air causesa microburst to become narroweras
it approaches the groundso that it may have a diameter of less than a kilometernear the ground. When
the air in a microburst slzikesthe ground,itscootsout horizontallyin a divergingpatternfrom a central point
(or nadir).
Due to the stronglydivergentair, a movingaircraftfirstexperiencesa headwind,which increases lift, rapidly
followed by a tailwind,which reduces liftby reducing the relativespeed of the aircraft. A signifk;antlossof
altitude can occur which, depending on the altitudeof the aircraft,can cause a crash.
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